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o universal truths about war exist?
When does the immutable become, well,
mutable? Rethinking warfighting fundamentals
like the principles of war raises such questions.
Sadly, what is enduring about war is its relentless,
tragic horror.
Other aspects of the human dimension also
remain unchanged. The apprehension and determination a young Marine feels on the battlefield today
are the same as the young Athenian felt on the Plain
of Marathon in 490 B.C. Yet it is equally true that
social, economic, political, and technological factors evolve war’s practice if not its essence.
The traditional principles of war describe, as one
document puts it, “those aspects of warfare that are
universally true and relevant.”1 Today they typically
include unity of command, objective, offensive,
mass, maneuver, economy of force, security, surprise, and simplicity.2 Over the ages the list has
varied somewhat because what is common in one
era might be rare or absent altogether in another. The
necessity for recalibrations from time to time simply
reflects the humanness (if not humanity) of war.

The Modernized Principles
of War

Modernizing the traditional principles of war for
21st-century conflicts does not render older versions
irrelevant. To the contrary, the intent of modernizing the principles of war is to capture the spirit
of existing ones. For example, informed insight,
when properly understood, incorporates elements
of security and surprise. Likewise, the modernized
principles of war such as perceived worthiness,
informed insight, strategic anchoring, engagement dominance, unity of effect, adaptability, and
culminating power strive to capture the essential
objective, among other traditional principles. In
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short, the aim is not wholesale replacement of the
traditional principles, per se, but rather a renovation
that is conscious of the lasting value of the old.
Perceived worthiness. Why men fight and why
they stop fighting are the classic inquiries of military
thinkers. Ultimately, the answer is about worthiness.
What makes it worthwhile for people to risk their
lives in armed combat? What persuades them to
make the enormous sacrifices war can require? For
some, it is high-minded purposes such as achieving or preserving freedom. For others, it concerns
personal honor, comradeship, or simply survival.
Worthiness goes to the fundamental mindset of
people both individually and collectively.
Assuming that worthiness necessarily equates to
moral good is a mistake, however. Various groups
might conclude that ethnic hatred, Lebensraum
(living space), or any number of malevolent ration
ales add up to acceptable motivators for violence.
Worthiness is a matter of subjective perspective, not
objective merit. What is important is what a belligerent believes warrants war. Hence, this principle
appends “perceived” to the idea of worthiness.
Thoughtful theorists suggest that the related
concept of will should become a principle of war
because overcoming an opponent’s resolve is the
central task of war.3 In key respects, it is always a
center of gravity. Although will has ready touchstones in military literature, perceived worthiness
peels it back to address its underpinnings. For the
warfighter, it literally asks the right question, the
“why” of an antagonist’s hostility. Opportunity lies
in the answer. Sufficiently erode the perception of
worthiness among decisive elements of an adversary’s combat power, and the effort disintegrates,
even if the physical capability to continue remains
intact. Conversely, when it collapses among friendly
forces, defeat likely follows.
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Most opponents of the United States no
longer pursue traditional military victory, per
se. Instead, they try to get us to perceive that
the goal no longer justifies the anticipated sacrifice of American blood and treasure. This is
why managing perceptions among friend and
foe is so important to 21st-century conflicts.
To create the right perceptions, leaders need
informed insight.
Informed insight. Informed insight seeks
to make sense of the cacophony that swirls
around concepts like information superiority
and dominance. Suffused with the notion that
more is always better, investments pour into
various collection capabilities in an insatiable
drive to accumulate information. While it is
necessary to cast a wide net to ensure one is
fully informed, warfighters need more than
raw data, however voluminous.
Fusing information is the real challenge. It is not
just gleaning relevant data from the mass; it is appreciating the human factors of information conveyance. How much can a commander usefully absorb
and at what rate? Unless information is digested, it is
as if it does not exist. That said, even comprehensive
and well-fused reports will not, alone, produce the
winning information differential.
The reasons are several. Digitization of data of all
kinds makes plenty of militarily useful information
freely available on the Web. In the future if anything
exists in an electrical form, we must assume it is
in the hands of the adversary. Moreover, technology such as Web crawlers, intelligent robots, and
other relatively inexpensive autonomous means
will likely do much of the fusing work. Third-party
corporations already exist to fuse information for
anyone for a price.
All of these developments will level the battlefield
informationwise. Consequently, in many situations,
warfighters should not waste time on the quixotic
task of trying to achieve information superiority or
dominance. Rather, they ought to develop doctrines
and strategies for fighting in an environment of
complete information transparency.
Authenticity will be the critical feature of information in 21st-century warfare. Manipulating and
altering data, including images that exist electronically, is just too easy. Although technology itself
might provide some solutions, the side that quickly
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verifies the legitimacy of information will have a
significant edge. A new-style fog of war will mark
modern conflicts as vast quantities of cleverly misleading data and outright disinformation flood decision centers and threaten to bury genuine facts.
The true asymmetric advantage does not come
from information accumulation, but from the cognitive component of the warfighter. The insights
drawn from information make the real difference.
Data, no matter how all-encompassing, well-fused,
or timely, cannot provide insight, which is not just
knowing what the enemy is thinking and saying,
but intuiting what he will think and do even before
he knows. Thus, informed insight can capture a
conventional principle like surprise and employ it
offensively or defensively.
How does one acquire insight? The answer is
experience and native talent combined with a widescoped liberal education, formally or informally
acquired. These, coupled with a solid technological orientation and complemented by exhaustive
study of all aspects of a foe’s specific situation,
can produce, if not wisdom, at least more astute
evaluations.
The ability to focus matters. Napoleon spent
hours alone deliberating about his battle plans. Time
and again, this technique produced brilliant military
insights. Obviously, the speed of modern warfare
limits emulation of Napoleon’s technique, but technology and behavioral studies might produce useful
approaches. A distributed analytical process that
links and synergizes the mental muscle of disparate
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leadership elements is yet another possibility for
exploration. Nonetheless, the innate military genius
of individuals still counts. That genius, however,
must have firm strategic anchoring.
Strategic anchoring. Strategic anchoring means
consciously anchoring every action in a strategic context. The principle recasts the objective to highlight
the potential the information revolution gives to all
combatant actions. The traditional notion of objective is constituent to strategic anchoring because
activities so connected automatically coalesce on the
right goal at any level of war. In the Information Age,
few objectives are exclusively tactical or operational,
or even military. Each has latent strategic implications, some of profound importance.
General Charles C. Krulak’s conceptualization of
the strategic corporal epitomizes this phenomenon.4 Actions at the tactical level,
including even those of the ordinary
corporal, overlooked in previous
conflicts, can have far-reaching
effects. The stunning strategic
effect of the misconduct of a
few low-ranking soldiers at Abu
Ghraib prison amply illustrates
Krulak’s point. The scandal
was a defeat in every sense of
the word except, perhaps, the
traditional kinetic one. Intentionally organizing actions around
strategic purposes is essential.
In 21st-century conflicts, how we
fight can determine if (and what) we
win. Unfortunately, absent firm strategic
anchoring, concentration on the objective encourages an unproductive fixation on short-term ends in
isolation from other imperatives. The notion of “we
had to burn the village in order to save it” typifies
the problem. Globalized information systems can
rapidly create adverse political effects from military
actions, even actions that fit customary notions of
victory. Accordingly, leaders must consciously
shape even seemingly minor actions to account for
the strategic potential each possesses.
Strategic anchoring takes issue with the prominence of the offensive in popular military thought.
Unbridled obsession with an undifferentiated view
of the offensive is dangerous.5 Of course, restraining
undisciplined offensive impulses is not the same as
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endorsing passivity. An active defensive that inflicts
persistent stress on challengers while shrewdly
avoiding unintended consequences deserves equal
billing with the offensive. Linking all actions to
their strategic anchor best accomplishes that aim.
Durability readily informs the efficacy and relevance
of strategic anchoring.
Durability. Much of the value of durability as
a modernized principle of war resides in its exquisite lucidity. Durability reflects the basic idea of
continuing utility for the intended purpose despite
hard use. In the military context, durability extends
from the immediately practical to entire strategic
themes. Along the way, the tenet subsumes several
traditional principles. For example, modern commanders who are thinking durability will naturally
incorporate security into their planning.
Pundits quip that amateurs talk strategy
and professionals talk logistics. What
is clearly axiomatic is that durability depends on logistics. Consequently, the side that solves the
vexing logistical issues intrinsic
to modern warfare will reap
a huge return. Consider how
influential a scientific breakthrough that provides power
sources to quench burgeoning
(and burdensome) fuel demands
could be. If human-nourishment
requirements are lessened, possibly
through advances in biotechnology,
force durability would be dramatically
enhanced. Of course, seeking to disrupt the
often-voracious logistics of militaries endures as
a feature of modern conflicts.
Durability is more than mere physical sustainment, however; it extends to strategy. Military
commanders from Xenophon to George Washington
to Mao Tse-tung appreciated that a force durable
enough to maintain existence is, in itself, a strategy
that precludes one’s rival from attaining victory.
Adversaries, especially irregulars, continue to
attempt to draw out conflicts in the hopes of exhausting seemingly more powerful foes.
Nevertheless, past successes of similar strategies
will be increasingly difficult to replicate. In a netted
world that illuminates virtually every phone call,
every financial transaction, and every plane flight,
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Ultimately, war is still an art, and like
all artistic endeavors, human imagination
will continue to drive inventive forms and
executions of its subject. In a sense, the most
basic of the principles of war is the need to
constantly challenge, reevaluate, and modernize all of them. The job is never done.
anonymity is becoming harder to achieve. Covertly
sustaining logistics even for relatively low-demand
insurgent operations will not be easy. In particular,
obtaining advanced medical care surreptitiously
might be nearly impossible. Carefully studying the
implications of durability on an adversary might
be the greatest source of fresh solutions to thorny
military problems.
Another important durability consideration is
that technology of all kinds now reaches even the
remotest areas of the world and is quickly spawning
generations addicted to it. Accordingly, a “death
of a thousand cuts” strategy might profit those
who exploit such a habituation because even small
techno-encumbrances can accumulate into debilitating friction. Taking advantage of superior resources
to produce redundancies and alternatives, as well as
steeling one’s own forces to technology loss, is fast
becoming essential to force durability.
In modern conflicts, durability requires extraordinary mental toughness. Persevering in the face
of the enormous stress the lethality of modern
battlefields produces, withstanding increasingly
sophisticated psychological warfare, and tolerating
extreme deprivation place a huge premium on professionalism, especially discipline. Winning forces
must be disciplined and confident, and few things
enhance troop confidence more than engagement
dominance.
Engagement dominance. The theory behind
engagement dominance is not complicated. Beginning with David’s defeat of Goliath, military history
graphically demonstrates the value of this often
overlooked principle. The concept calls for striking
an opponent with impunity by outranging, outgunning, or even outwitting him through deception and
surprise. The fearsome 14-foot pikes of Alexander’s
phalanxes killed thousands of short-sworded infantrymen before they could land a blow; English
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bowmen destroyed the flower of French knighthood
from long distance at Crécy; and during the first Gulf
War, American tanks simply outranged Iraqi T-72s to
win a crushing victory at the Battle of 73 Easting.
Obtaining engagement-dominating technology is complicated, however. Although everyone
intuitively appreciates that advanced warfighting
hardware can separate winners from losers, too
many assume that all technology is an unqualified
“good.” The result? Confusion about such critically
important but intricate concepts as transformation,
system of systems, battlespace awareness, and
more. Worse, research and development (R&D)
efforts diffuse wastefully into solutions in search
of problems. Replicating engagement dominance’s
past triumphs requires orienting sufficient R&D
toward the overarching problem of war: preempting or disrupting an opponent’s ability to bring his
weapons to bear.
Another aspect of the engagement-dominance
solution is methodological. Employing weaponry
at the right time is as, or more, important than the
sophistication of the equipment itself. This calls
for processes that allow commanders to get inside
the enemy’s observe, orient, decide, act cycle that
applies combat power.6 Using superior capabilities
effectively to seize the initiative and to deny it to the
foe produces engagement dominance. Furthermore,
engagement dominance incorporates and simplifies
maneuver and can impose or oppose surprise. It even
results from the actions of third parties through the
orchestration of unity of effect.
Unity of effect. The traditional principles of war
speak of unity of command with its implicit assumption of direction and control. What really counts in
war, however, are effects, however obtained. While
putting available resources into a workable chain of
command always helps, leveraging that which is
beyond command and control is especially valuable.
Unity of effect, therefore, reinterprets economy of
force and even mass and maneuver by accentuating results.
Examples of leveraging the uncontrollable are
many. Weather has long created effects with military
implications. For example, during the second Gulf
War commanders destroyed Republican Guard units
by exploiting the fatal assumption by Iraqi leaders
that sandstorms made armor movements invisible
to airpower. Throughout history, warfighters have

45

NARA

also obtained positive results from the savvy use of
geography, even though they enjoyed no dominion
over it.
Deriving operational effects from third-party activities is especially important in modern conflicts. The
Madrid train bombings, which occurred shortly before
the Spanish elections in 2004, represent a clever
(albeit heartless) illustration. The bombings influenced voters as intended, and the new government
withdrew its troops from Iraq. The practical effect
was indistinguishable from a traditional defeat: The
combat power of 1,400 Spanish soldiers was lost.
Obtaining advantage from the actions of dispar
ate, proxy groups is a force multiplier. Proxies in
modern warfare might not always realize their role.
For many reasons, warring groups might have no
formal or even informal connection with entities
that produce effects that nevertheless serve their
interests. Alliances of the unknowing will exist, and

U.S. Army

Nutter, U.S. Army

An M-4 Sherman tank with a “rhino plow” attached in front
has just punched its way through a Normandy hedgerow.
Note the infantrymen riding on the back of the tank.

the skillful use of Internet appeals for action is but
one example of how they might form.
Consensus-building optimizes unity of effect.
Even where a unified command structure allegedly
exists, pragmatic commanders might still find persuasive skills the most valued implement in their
warfighting toolkit. Modern warfighting effects, not
the niceties of wiring diagrams, are the coins of the
realm. Achieving unity of effect will require a great
deal of forward-thinking adaptability.
Adaptability. Adaptability is a hallmark of the
American way of war. During World War II, innovative American Soldiers bolted homemade plows
onto tanks to cut through hedgerows frustrating
the breakout from Normandy. During the Korean
War General Douglas McArthur’s Inchon landings
were an operational-level adaptation to a battlefield
impasse. The spirit lives on: During the second Gulf
War, Soldiers adapted to the threat of improvised
explosive devices and small arms fire by welding
“hillbilly armor” to their vehicles.
Adaptability better explains commonly misconstrued concepts like asymmetric warfare, which is
nothing more than adapting warfighting means and
methods to apply one’s strengths against an opponent’s weakness. Adaptability presupposes flexibility, but it does not mandate simplicity. Indeed,
complexity breeds lucrative opportunities. Adaptation that employs high technology and requires
trained, disciplined troops is difficult to counter.
Linking a handful of Special Forces with aircraft
overhead to produce real-time precision bombing
is a complicated adaptive response that broke years
of stalemate on Afghanistan battlefields.

BG Courtney Whitney; GEN Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of U.N. Forces; and MG Edward M.
Almond observe the shelling of Inchon from the U.S.S.
Mt. McKinley, 15 September 1950.
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SGT Clay O’Dell, 3-112th Armor Battalion, 56th Brigade
Combat Team, 36th Infantry Division, welds a 3/8-inch
steel armor plate on a HMMWV in southern Iraq.
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Encouraging the creative instincts of subordinates
is vital, as is an organizational culture friendly to
rapid implementation of adaptive ideas. At the same
time, however, inappropriately reflexive adaptations
fail. Some out-of-the-box ideas are deservedly offthe-table; others need more development. Consider
the Jeune Ecole’s (young school’s) advocacy of torpedo boats as the French Navy’s adaptive response
to the capital ships of other European powers of
the late 19th century. Despite presaging submarine
warfare, the movement prematurely dismissed the
importance of battleships and did not anticipate the
emergence of aircraft carriers.
In modern conflicts, prized leadership qualities
include the ability to rapidly sort through proposals as well as tolerance for the risks inherent to
adaptation. Naturally, adaptability aims to produce
culminating power.
Culminating power. The concept of culminating
power answers the question: What type and measure
of military (or other) power is needed to attain satisfactory closure at a given level of conflict? Ordinarily,
the answer would be “enough,” either to annihilate
one’s adversary or to make him perceive that continued resistance is not worthwhile. Culminating power
encompasses elements of the traditional principles of
war, such as offensive, mass, maneuver, and economy
of force, without explicitly requiring any of them.
What constitutes adequate culminating power
depends on the situation. Surprisingly, at the strategic level it could involve a classic decisive battle.
Such engagements are not passé; the fall of Stanley
effectively ended the 1980 Falklands/Malvinas War,
and the fall of Kandahar collapsed Taliban power
in 2003. Future commanders might well impose a
Dien Bien Phu effect on selected adversaries with
great success.
Misunderstanding culminating power is easy
today. Although conventional North Vietnamese
divisions led the final assault on Saigon in 1975,
that conflict, along with many of the post-World
War II colonial wars, produced the widespread belief
that guerrilla operations render orthodox militaries
almost wholly irrelevant. Actually, low-intensity
warfare usually succeeds only in the absence of
high-intensity risk to a major power’s fundamental security interests. True, insurgents in several
colonial conflicts did force their opponents to tally
the worth of fighting. Typically, the potential gains
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could not offset the investment needed to acquire
enough culminating power to win. (Given the dismal
economic performance of most former colonies, the
calculations were largely accurate.)
Even in conflicts driven by ideology, such as Vietnam, a party will eventually objectively compute what
it would have to do to conclude the conflict successfully. When it became clear that South Vietnam was not
moving toward an effective democratic government,
the American people calculated that the effort was not
worthy of continued support given the costs.7
Regardless, when the stakes are higher, the
arithmetic of culminating power differs radically,
which is important in the zero-sum game of national
security budgetary battles. Of significance is that
neither Iraqi insurgents nor Al Qaeda terrorists can
acquire sufficient culminating power to threaten the
United States’ basic security interest—America’s
continued existence as a free nation.
Terrorists can wreak savage injury—especially
using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—but
only a peer competitor with a sizeable WMD capability can imperil America’s survival. This should
give pause to those who ridicule so-called legacy
systems such as attack and ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-capable bombers and missiles, and
show-stopping weapons like the F-22A. As important as defeating terrorism and other low-intensity
forms of warfare might be, considerations of the
larger context must guide decisionmaking.

Guideposts for the Future

Modernized principles of war could serve as
guideposts (but not stop signs) for military and civilian leaders embroiled in 21st-century conflicts. Such
principles could aid the conduct of war and assist
in organizing, training, and equipping for the same.
When appropriately interrelated, the modernized
principles suggest ways to strengthen friendly forces
and indicate vulnerabilities in enemy operations. Of
course, the best commanders will deviate from the
principles as the fortunes of war dictate. Moreover,
the modernized principles will inevitably evolve.
Ultimately, war is still an art, and like all artistic
endeavors, human imagination will continue to
drive inventive forms and executions of its subject.
In a sense, the most basic of the principles of war
is the need to constantly challenge, reevaluate, and
modernize all of them. The job is never done.
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In security matters, intellectual stasis could be fatal.
The great danger today, for example, is assuming that the
irregular warfare of current conflicts is the inescapable
template for future wars. (Is occupying another sullen
and hostile population really the likeliest scenario?)

Finally, we must continue to search for peace
even as we prepare for war. We can hope that the
melancholy belief that “only the dead have seen the
end of war” is wrong, so long as we always realize
that hope is not a principle of war.8 MR
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Early Risers
Across the dim parade field that foregrounds
the vista, crows in fir trees wrought like spires
watch barracks wake in synchronous lighting
where young men rouse to demands for order.
They move out in rows of compliant minds,
U.S. Army photo by Martin Greeson

their last letters from home held close in thought—
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each caring word faithful to cadenced steps
as crows rise, scatter, and merge into clouds.
—Major Jeffrey Alfiers, USAF
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